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Abstract 
This paper aims to describe how a commercially successful innovation occurs 
with the altering of the existing competitive structure in a market under 
environmental and competitive pressures.  I study the history of the laundry 
detergent market in Japan and elucidate the manner in which Kao accomplished 
an innovation and increased their market share during the late 1980s.  Kao 
introduced their new detergent Attack through a biotechnological innovation and 
dramatically changed the competitive structure to their advantage.  The 
innovations introduced were of two kinds 1) fermentation engineering 
technologies to improve the cleaning performance of detergents by using 
alkaline cellulase, and 2) concentration of detergents to four times their earlier 
strength through changes in their powder processing technologies.  This 
historical innovation that occurred in the laundry detergent market in Japan has 
a contemporary implication because combining firms’ activities and 
environmental sustainability has been one of the most crucial topics over recent 
years. 
 
Keywords Innovation, laundry detergent market, Japan, competitive strategy, 
environmental pressures 
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1. The laundry detergent market in Japan 
Introduction 
Innovation is a critical driver for industrial development and economic 
growth.  It contributes to the development of countries' industries and 
economies and drastically changes societies and the competitive structures of 
product markets.  From the perspective of enterprises, it is rather important to 
identify how an innovation occurs and the manner in which it alters a market 
structure.  At the same time, global warming and other environmental issues 
are making every firm conscious of their social responsibilities and it has 
become rather important for firms to become environmentally conscious.  
However, business and environmental consciousness sometimes become 
incompatible, and there are certain firms that consider consciousness regarding 
the global environment as a type of mandatory cost.  This implies that there is 
ample scope to study how certain firms possess a combination of business and 
environmental consciousness. 
This paper examines how a firm accomplishes an innovation under 
environmental and competitive pressures.  In order to determine this process, 
we study the laundry detergent market in Japan especially in the 1980s as a 
case.  The following are the three reasons for selecting this market in the 
1980s: Firstly, the market experienced a considerable change in terms of market 
share owing to a biotechnological innovation by Kao.  This is the reason for 
especially investigating Kao's activities in this paper despite the existence of 
another leading laundry detergent company known as Lion.  Secondly, this 
industry is closely associated with environmental issues because usually, 
consumers simply use detergents with water and drain the mixture.  Finally, 
there was a huge controversy regarding the influence of detergent on the 
environment during the 1970s and 1980s in Japan.  Therefore, it is more useful 
to investigate the firms' behaviours during that period rather than during the 
recent period.  There is a significant general observation regarding the linkage 
between environmental pressures and innovations in the worldwide laundry 
detergent market (Johnson and Marcus 1996) but it does not refer to the roles of 
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enterprises in depth.  Therefore, this paper provides a detailed account of the 
events at both the industry and firm levels in Japan. 
 
Kao and the laundry detergent market in Japan 
The following were the two key characteristics of the laundry detergent 
market in Japan during the 1980s: First, a majority of the detergent products 
were available in powdered form and the proportion of liquid detergents was 
negligible; this has changed over recent years.  Second, the market was 
oligopolistic; this has thus far remained unchanged.  Kao and Lion are the two 
leading domestic laundry detergent companies in Japan. 
Graph 1 indicates the market shares of different detergent brands in Japan since 
1973.  First, this graph indicates that the domestic market is an oligopolistic one 
dominated by the following three major companies: Kao, Lion and Procter and 
Gamble (P&G).  Second, it indicates that Kao's market share in Japan 
dramatically soared to over 40 percent in 1988 and to 50 percent in 1989.  This 
is because Kao launched their new brand of detergent called Attack in 1987.  
Since Attack is an innovative product, Kao has successfully managed to sustain 
their competitive advantage.  Attack not only contributed to increasing Kao's 
market share but also played a role in de-maturing the industry.  It was 
commonly believed that the laundry detergent market was rather well 
established and there was no further scope to de-mature the market.  However, 
Kao's Attack stimulated consumer behaviour and fostered the growth of the 
mature market once again. 
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In Japan, Kao is considered exceptional.  Despite the fact that numerous 
Japanese firms have been struggling on account of low profitability (Fujiwara 
2003), Kao has been experiencing growth owing to their high profitability levels.  
Graph 2 indicates Kao's sales and profitability in terms of return on sales (ROS) 
since 1964.  Kao had struggled with a decline in their ROS levels from the 
mid-1960s to the mid-1980s; however, their ROS levels began recovering in the 
mid-1980's.  Their ROS is now over ten percent, which is considered to be 
significantly high among Japanese enterprises. 
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Kao is involved in a number of businesses.  The laundry detergent business is 
one of their most traditional and prime businesses.  The main product that has 
been supporting its competitive advantage in the laundry detergent market is 
Attack, which was introduced in April 1987.  Before launching Attack, their 
market share was approximately mid-30 percent, which was very close to the 
market share of their main competitor, Lion.  However, Kao developed 
innovative biotechnologies and succeeded in fundamentally improving the 
cleaning function of their detergent powders and in concentrating their detergent 
four times more compact than other detergent products as indicated in picture 1, 
which was a great commercial success.  They delivered outstanding cleaning 
power with just one-fourth of the volume of conventional detergents. 
The important consideration here is to determine exactly how Kao succeeded in 
developing these two products simultaneously.  This paper aims at illustrating 
the longitudinal process of how the innovation occurred and changed the 
competitive structure of the laundry detergent market in Japan, and elucidating 
the manner in which Kao accomplished the innovation and increased their 
market share in the late 1980s.  This paper will demonstrate both the internal 
activities within Kao as well as the external pressures for them.   
Picture 1: Zabu (on the left) and Attack (on the right) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
        Source: Presentation by Dr Moriyasu Murata (February 2010) 
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In order to analyse this process, this paper follows Martin and Eisenhardt's 
(2010) procedure of data collection.  This paper mainly employed the following 
data sources: interviews and archival data such as internal documents, press 
releases, websites and news articles.  Seven informants were interviewed and 
12 semi-structured interviews comprising both open- and closed-ended 
questions were conducted.  The informants were selected through snowball 
sampling (Patton 2002), and all of them were highly knowledgeable.  Of these, 
six informants worked for Kao and were involved in the development of Attack, 
and one informant worked for Lion.  The information obtained by asking the 
same questions to the informer working in Lion was rather useful in terms of 
investigating the events in the detergent market. 
  
2. The three challenges during the 1970s 
In the 1970s, the domestic laundry detergent market experienced three 
major challenges.  The first challenge was the use of enzymes.  The industry 
originally began using enzymes in the late 1960s; however, they had to 
temporarily suspend their use in the early 1970s because they faced criticisms 
for harming the environment by using enzymes.  The second challenge was the 
development of phosphate-free detergents.  During the 1970s, the detergent 
companies were being criticized regarding the presence of phosphate in the 
detergents, which were causing serious water pollution in Japan because 
phosphate is believed to be the main cause of eutrophication, which leads to the 
occurrence of red tides.  In response, since phosphate contributed to the 
cleaning function, the detergent companies were required to identify another 
material for substituting phosphate in detergents.  As a result, detergent 
companies switched to using enzymes in their detergents once again during the 
late 1970s.  Finally, the third challenge was the introduction of concentrated 
product formulations.  The companies attempted to decrease the size of the 
granules in order to reduce the product size; however, they received little 
success because they failed to attract consumers.  The reason for failing to 
attract customers has been mentioned later in the paper. 
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The increased use of enzymes and subsequent temporary reluctance in 
the use enzymes 
The first domestic challenge was the increased use of enzymes in 
detergents and the subsequent temporary discontinuation of their usage.  This 
movement initially occurred overseas in the early 1960s.  The first 
bacterial-enzyme detergent was marketed in 1963 by a Dutch company, 
Kortmann and Schulte; they used Alcalase, which is a kind of Protease, that was 
manufactured by another Danish company, Novo.  Other leading detergent 
companies like Procter and Gamble, Unilever, Colgate and Henkel soon 
followed this movement and added enzymes in their detergent preparations 
(Quax 2006). 
In the late 1960s, Japanese companies gradually realized the advantages of 
adding enzymes and began adding them in their detergent preparations.  The 
first domestic company to have introduced a powder detergent with enzymes 
was not a leading company like Kao or Lion, but Daiichi Kogyo Seiyaku, which 
held only a minor share in the market.  In January 1968, Daiichi Kogyo Seiyaku 
introduced Monogen-Oru, a detergent containing enzymes, in Japan.  Other 
companies also launched their new detergents containing enzymes around the 
same time; Nippon Oil and Fats (Nihon Yushi) introduced Bari in March 1968 
and Asahi Denka (now ADEKA) introduced New Adeka Soft in March 1969. 
In contrast, Lion did not follow this movement at all.  They carefully assessed 
the effects of enzymes and concluded that it did not significantly contribute to the 
cleaning function of the detergent (Kondo 1973).  Although Europeans have a 
custom of washing laundry with warm water or to initially soak and subsequently 
wash the laundry, which makes the enzymes in laundry detergents effective, 
these customs of washing laundry were not so popular in Japan and therefore, 
Lion concluded that adding enzymes in detergents would not be effective in 
Japan.  Lion did not sell any detergent that contained enzymes during the 
1970s.  Kao was also reluctant to add enzymes to their detergents for the same 
reason as Lion.  Kao finally began their explorative research and development 
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activities around the end of 1967, that is, just before Daiichi Kogyo Seiyaku had 
introduced Monogen-Oru.  Even after they had begun their research activities, 
the progress continued to be slow.  Although they purchased Alcalase from 
Novo and explored its potentiality, they were uncertain regarding the 
effectiveness of these components.  In March 1970, two years after the 
introduction of Monogen-Oru, Kao finally launched Super Zabu Koso, which 
contained the enzyme that they had developed on their own. 
The new product became a big success during the first year.  They reported 
that although their initial projection for the sales of Super Zabu Koso in 1970 was 
3.3 billion yen, the actual sales were 4.591 billion yen.  In spite of their 
commercial success, Kao discontinued the production of Super Zabu Koso in 
1971 owing to a doubt on the safety of all laundry detergents containing 
enzymes.  Kao restarted the production of detergents with enzymes only once 
the safety of all the components of these detergents was confirmed, and 
introduced Zabu XK in March 1973.  They added Protease and Amylase which 
breaks down starch in this new detergent; however, their efforts did not alleviate 
consumers' apprehensions regarding the acceptance of detergents containing 
enzymes.  As a result, laundry detergents containing enzymes temporarily 
disappeared from the domestic market.  The wave of adding enzymes to 
detergents returned when the laundry detergent companies were compelled to 
remove phosphate from their detergents, as is described subsequently. 
 
Environmental pressures on detergent companies 
The second challenge was removing phosphate from detergents.  
Phosphate was widely used as builders in detergents in order to soften hard 
water and improve surfactant performance; surfactant performance indicates the 
ability of detergents to clean laundries.  Although the use of phosphate was 
effective, the laundry detergent industry faced a serious problem because 
phosphate was causing serious water pollution and leading to the occurrence of 
red tides in the lakes.  At that time, the two biggest lakes in Japan—Biwako and 
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Kasumigaura—were adversely affected by the occurrence of red tides and 
companies and factories encountered a wave of criticism. 
The reactions of Lion and Kao to this movement were contrastive; although Lion 
actively reacted to this movement, Kao was slow to react.  As a result, Lion was 
the first mover in the development of phosphate-free detergents.  Lion began 
reducing their use of phosphate in the early 1970s and introduced a 
phosphate-free detergent, Seseragi, in autumn 1973, which ended up in a poor 
success because of its dismal cleaning performance.  However, Lion continued 
their research activities and introduced Spark 25 in 1975, which was not 
phosphate-free but contained reduced quantities of phosphate.  They used 
Zeolite as a non-phosphate-based builder; however, Zeolite was unable to 
improve the cleaning performance effectively.  Lion was struggling to determine 
how to deliver effective cleaning performance without using phosphate. 
As written above, Lion did not intend adding enzymes at all during the early 
1970s. But they changed their strategy and began developing a laundry 
detergent with enzymes because they realized that they must reduce the 
proportion of phosphate in their detergents and required another material to 
effectively complement the cleaning performance of phosphate.  They 
purchased Alcalase from Novo and developed a new product called Top.  
Despite using reduced quantities of phosphate Top was able to increase 
cleaning efficiency by 10 percent.  Owing to functional improvements, as soon 
as Lion launched Top on 8 March 1979, it experienced phenomenal success and 
accounted for 40 percent of Lion's overall company sales for a short period of 
time.  Top was made phosphate-free in October 1980 and succeeded in further 
popularizing its brand name. 
Although Kao demonstrated slow progress, they were compelled to follow the 
phosphate-free movement around 1979, when the local ordinance banning 
phosphates was enacted in the Shiga prefecture where Biwako is located.  That 
local ordinance was extremely strict in that they prohibited people in Shiga from 
selling, buying, giving and presenting synthetic detergents.  Shiga had enacted 
such a strict ordinance owing to the following reason: At the time, Biwako was 
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facing serious problems due to the occurrence of red tides, and Masayoshi 
Takemura, who was 40 years old, was elected as the youngest prefectural 
governor in Shiga with the support of a few grassroot movements that aimed to 
purge synthetic detergents.  In response, Kao finally decided to introduce 
phosphate-free detergents and introduced Just Funmatsu in March 1980, that is, 
half a year before Lion's introduction of phosphate-free Top.  
However, as mentioned earlier, Lion's Top was rather successful, and was able 
to retain its competitive advantage even after Kao had introduced 
phosphate-free Zabu Koso in August 1981 and had made their extant product, 
New Beads, phosphate-free.  In response, Lion made Blue Dia phosphate-free 
and launched a new detergent called Pinky, which was also phosphate-free.  
As a result of these competitive interactions, the laundry detergent industry in 
Japan progressed toward becoming an environmentally conscious industry. 
 
Concentrated powder detergents 
The third challenge was to produce more concentrated detergents.  
During the 1970s, the major competitors were continuously increasing the sizes 
of the package boxes because consumers could save money by purchasing 
larger packages.  Lion, Kao and P&G were keen to sell their Otokuyou 
(meaning economic) products for a cheaper price in order to acquire greater 
market shares.  This homogeneous competition lowered their profitability levels, 
and Kao was the first mover to differentiate their products by increasing the 
concentration of the detergent powder and scaling down its package.  They 
began to devote additional resources into the project of increasing the 
concentrations of the detergents, which was initiated in around 1969. 
In July 1975, Kao introduced New Zabu and New New Beads, which were 
concentrated twice as compact as their extant detergents.  They priced a 1.66 
kg package for 600 yen, which was indeed 90 yen cheaper than their extant 
products.  In order to pursue this strategy, they soon launched two new 
concentrated powder laundry detergents, New White Wonderful and New 
Popins, in November 1975.  Lion was also quick to follow Kao and launched a 
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new concentrated detergent, Spark 25, in November 1975, and Pinky 25 and 
Blue Chime 25 in 1976.  In addition to that, the first oil crisis occurred in 1973.  
This compelled companies to reduce the use of materials and switch to 
concentrated detergents that fit the economic environment.  The president of 
Lion, Hiroshi Kobayashi said, 'If concentrated detergents become dominant in 
the market, the industry will be able to reduce the use of resources by 44.5 
billion yen per year.1'  It appeared that the major dimension of competition 
would shift from 'bigger is better’ to 'more compact is better'. 
However, these new strategies did not fit consumers' needs in the least.  One 
reason for this was that consumers did not consider the compact detergents to 
be economical.  Consumers were accustomed to putting approximate amounts 
of detergents into washing machines directly from the package boxes and did 
not check the exact amounts that they were using.  Thus, they tended to use 
even the concentrated detergents in the same manner and as a result would run 
out of detergent rather rapidly; this made the consumers believe that the prices 
of the compact detergent products were relatively higher.  Kao discontinued the 
production of New Zabu and New Beads in 1977.  P&G also subsequently 
discontinued the production of concentrated detergents, followed by Lion in 1979.  
Finally, concentrated detergents disappeared for some time.   
 
3. Inside Kao: The product development of Attack 
Kao analysed the reasons for a lack of success of their compact 
detergents with enzymes and came to the following two conclusions:  One was 
that consumers did not experience any advantages of compactness of 
detergents because it was just twice as compact as the extant products.  The 
other was that Kao failed to sufficiently improve the cleaning performance in 
order to compete with Top.  In summary, they concluded that they were 
required to concentrate detergents more than before as well as add a larger 
quantity of effective enzymes.  They developed a technology for concentrating 
detergents in their laboratory in the Wakayama prefecture and focused on 
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identifying and producing an effective enzyme in their laboratories in Tochigi and 
Tokyo.  
 
Technology transfer and the development of technology for concentrating 
detergents 
Researchers attempted to further concentrate detergents in Kao's 
Wakayama laboratory.  After they confirmed that their extant technologies 
could not further concentrate detergents, they began exploring other useful 
technologies that were being utilized in other businesses of Kao.  In the course 
of this project, Kao identified a technician who had experience in the toner 
business for printers.  Since the powders of toners are much finer than that of 
detergents, the processing technologies accumulated in that business were 
superior to those in the detergent business particularly in terms of concentrating 
powders.  Thus, this technician suggested that they transfer the processing 
technologies of toners and further concentrate detergents by physically 
compressing powders in the same manner in which toners are manufactured.  
The project implemented his suggestion. 
However, subsequently, two challenges that were caused by employing the 
powder processing technologies of toners in the laundry detergent industry 
needed to be overcome.  One challenge was that their newly compressed 
powder grains lost their hollow structure that their original powder particles used 
to possess.  This hollow structure of the powder particles is important in that it 
improves the solubility of the powder detergents.  Kao was required to identify 
another way to retain the solubility without this hollow structure of the detergent 
particles, otherwise powder detergents would not dissolve effectively and would 
stick to the laundry.  The problem was resolved by adding a few chemicals to 
the detergent powders in order to foster their solubility.  Another challenge was 
adhesion; the surface of compressed powders became adhesive and as a result 
would become a big ball in the package boxes, which is known as caking.  On 
encountering this problem, Kao utilized Zeolite in a different way.  Although 
initially Zeolite was added inside the detergent particles of the detergent 
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powders as a substitute for phosphate, Kao noticed that if Zeolite was applied on 
the surface of the particles of the detergent powders, it would effectively prevent 
the detergent powder from becoming sticky.  Therefore, applying Zeolite not 
inside the particles but on their surfaces as an anti-caking agent succeeded in 
preventing the powder detergents from becoming sticky.  The company finally 
succeeded in transferring the powder processing technologies from the toner 
business to the detergent business within Kao and also in resolving the two 
major problems caused by the technology transfer.  
Owing to these abovementioned activities, the particles of the new concentrated 
powder were four times more compact than their extant one in terms of capacity; 
this new powder was twice as compact as the concentrated powder that had 
failed in 1975.  The technicians at the laboratory developed these powder 
processing technologies in the early 1980s and established them in 1986.  
These technologies were an important foundation for developing Attack, which 
was introduced in 1987.   
On the other hand, Dr Moriyasu Murata, a chief researcher at the Tokyo 
research laboratory of Kao, believed that only achieving this concentration was 
not sufficiently effective for attracting consumers.  He was the researcher who 
had led the concentration of the detergents to twice as much as the extant 
detergents in terms of their compactness in 1975, which had received poor 
market response, and strongly believed that they must combine the following 
two innovative improvements: concentration and cleaning performance.  
Although the researchers at the Wakayama laboratory were attempting to 
concentrate detergents, Murata, who was at the Tokyo laboratory of Kao, was 
simultaneously making efforts to improve the cleaning performance of the 
detergents.   
 
The development of Alkaline cellulases 
Murata was struggling with how to improve the cleaning performance of 
their detergents.  He repeatedly added and examined numerous enzymes and 
other possible materials into the detergents.  One day in around 1980, he used 
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cellulase for washing laundry and was astonished to see its excellent 
performance.  Cellulase was notably effective in increasing the cleaning power 
of detergents.  He soon directed a research staff under him, Akira Suzuki, to 
ascertain the mechanism of the cleaning effect of cellulase and to examine the 
possibility of adding it in their detergent powders.  Since cellulase is an enzyme 
renowned for hydrolyzing the cellulose from which cotton is made, most of the 
researchers believed that cellulase would damage clothes.  In that sense, it 
was considered to be common sense not to use cellulase with laundry 
detergents.  However, Murata directed Suzuki to carefully investigate the 
function and mechanism, and obtained the tentative hypothesis that the 
mechanism of the cleaning effect of cellulase may be like peeling a welsh onion.  
He said, 
I noticed one day that welsh onion with soil was obviously dirty but you 
could get it clean only by peeling the surface. … And I thought if we 
cleaned every fiber of laundry like that, we would be able to improve 
our cleaning performance fundamentally.  Based on this idea, I looked 
into what kind of fiber do people wear in Japan and found that 85 
percent of the textile was made from cotton, which meant all we had to 
do was focusing on how to shift stain from cotton.  So, we started 
examining the performance of cellulase because that enzyme 
hydrolyzes cotton2. 
Based on this hypothesis, Murata believed that the cleaning performance of 
detergents would definitely improve dramatically if they could clean the laundry 
in a manner that is similar to cleaning the soil off welsh onions by peeling them, 
and decided to challenge common sense.  Since the water to which detergents 
are added is weakly alkaline, Murata and his colleague Dr Shigeo Inoue began 
seeking a cellulase that functioned effectively in such alkaline water.  Since 
normal cellulase is effective only in weakly acidic water, even Novo's cellulase at 
that time did not suit their needs because it was most effective with warm water 
at 60 degrees at pH 7; therefore, they were required to identify and develop their 
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own alkaliphilic strain for producing alkaline cellulases that would be effective at 
lower degrees at higher pH on the alkaline side.   
Kao did not possess sufficient biotechnologies at the time and were facing 
numerous problems.  They were not aware whether any cellulase that could 
effectively function under weak alkaline water actually existed.  Murata and 
Inoue went to libraries numerous times in order to read through as many books 
on cellulase as possible, and found that Rikagaku Kenkyujo (abbreviated as 
RIKEN), which is a governmental laboratory in natural science, had a patent for 
the alkaline cellulase-producing strain.  As soon as they found that article, they 
visited Dr Koki Horikoshi, who had issued that patent and requested him to give 
them the alkaline cellulases and the strain.  They tested it at the Tokyo 
research laboratory and confirmed its noteworthy performance even under weak 
alkaline water. 
Establishing a high productivity of the strain that produced alkaline cellulases 
was next on the list.  Since laundry detergents are daily necessaries, Kao had 
to establish a stable mass production system; however, the strain they had 
received was not sufficiently productive for achieving that aim.  They needed to 
find a more productive strain and develop their biotechnologies, which would 
enable the production of large volumes of alkaline cellulases in a prompt and 
stable manner and at a reasonable cost.  In order to achieve this goal, they 
began establishing a few networks for researchers and professors in academic 
fields.  They studied biotechnologies from Kazuo Komagata at the University of 
Tokyo and requested him to introduce researchers in that field.  In doing so, 
they gradually expanded their own networks. 
Inoue was responsible for locating a productive strain.  Acquiring this strain 
would be like a blue bird of happiness for Kao; they believed that the strains that 
produced cellulases would be found in mountains and forests because cellulase 
decomposes the cellulose that is present in large quantities in plants.  Inoue 
and his colleagues visited numerous mountains, forests and fields all over Japan 
including those that were located at a distance from their home laboratories in 
order to find useful alkaliphilic strains; however, they finally found the effective 
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strain in the soil near Kao's Tochigi research laboratory.  This strain was 
significantly useful.  Inoue and his colleagues regarded this strain as ideal and 
termed it KSM635.  Subsequently, they began mutating the strain in order to 
facilitate the production of larger quantities of alkaline cellulases at the Tochigi 
research laboratory.  Around 1982, Inoue relocated from Tokyo to Tochigi in 
order to oversee the progress of the mutation of the strain.  The researchers in 
that project devoted almost all their efforts to this mutation activity.   
However, their R&D activities with respect to this project were allocated to two 
different places; the Tochigi research laboratory was responsible for mutating 
KSM635 and the Tokyo research laboratory was responsible for testing the 
alkaline cellulases produced by the mutated strains in order to confirm if its use 
was effective and appropriate in laundry detergents.  Owing to this division of 
work, they needed to commute between Tokyo and Tochigi rather often, which 
was inconvenient and inefficient, and decelerated the pace of their activities.  
Therefore, Kao decided to move almost all their R&D activities with respect to 
the improvement of the cleaning power of their laundry detergent from Tokyo to 
Tochigi, which enhanced the efficiency of their efforts.  Around the same time, 
Suzuki had determined the washing mechanism of cellulase; the functioning of 
cellulase was not similar to the peeling of a welsh onion.  Indeed, it acted in the 
amorphous regions of the cotton fibers, where the extant detergents and 
enzymes were unable to reach.  This was the reason why cellulase could 
effectively remove trapped stains; this implied that the alkaline cellulases 
produced by this strain did not damage clothes.  The properties of the alkaphilic 
strain fulfilled the essential requirements for the enzymes that could be used in 
laundry detergents (Hakamada, Koika, Yoshimatsu, Mori, Kobayashi and Ito 
1997).     
 
Establishing efficient mass production engineering technologies of 
alkaline cellulase 
The subsequent step was to establish efficient mass production 
engineering technologies of alkaline cellulase.  Although the researchers 
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fermented and produced enzymes in a flask or beaker at the Tochigi research 
laboratory, they actually had to conduct this experiment on a much larger scale, 
for example, in a plant.  This scaling up was rather challenging for the 
researchers.  It was critical to establish a few operating technologies for 
controlling the equality of temperature and the mixing efficiency of oxygen in 
their fermentation tanks.  It was also important to establish the technologies for 
preventing various kinds of minor germs from breeding inside the tanks, 
otherwise the strains producing alkaline cellulase would be screened and 
destroyed owing to the contamination by these germs. 
At that time, Kao did not have sufficient technologies and know-how for 
establishing these operating technologies.  They discussed the possibility of 
outsourcing the development of these technologies; however, they ultimately 
decided to develop them in-house because they believed that they could not 
develop their own biotechnologies unless they internalized and handled these 
activities.  Firstly, they installed fermentation tanks in the Wakayama research 
laboratory but they failed to operate them effectively.  This was because the 
plant manufacturer did not have sufficient know-how of fermentation and failed 
to build tanks that could fulfill Kao's requirements.  Subsequently, they changed 
their plan and installed different tanks in their plant in Kashima in the Ibaraki 
prefecture and began establishing the mass production engineering 
technologies there.  Inoue relocated from Tochigi to Ibaraki and joined this 
project with a staff, Kazuo Ishii3, who had originally been working in Kashima.  
They continued to face several challenges in the course of their activities there.  
For example, they temporarily changed the usual working schedule and 
allocated approximately 35 workers only to the development the engineering 
technologies during the busiest period. 
Their tension increased with every passing day.  This was not only because 
they were continuously struggling with the establishment of efficient 
technologies in Ibaraki, but also owing to the fact that the technologies of 
concentrating detergent powders were almost established in Wakayama, as 
illustrated earlier in this paper.  The members in Wakayama were eagerly 
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awaiting the development of alkaline cellulase, which put pressure on the 
researchers in Ibaraki.  In addition to those two reasons, at that time, the 
potential applications of the fermentation engineering technologies to other 
businesses of Kao were rather limited and the laundry detergent business was 
the prime and almost only business to which these technologies could be 
applied.  Thus, applying their biotechnologies to their laundry detergent 
business was rather critical for the researchers in that field for legitimizing their 
R&D activities, and they could not miss this precious opportunity.  Under those 
pressures, Inoue, Ishii and their staff finally established almost all the 
technologies by the end of 1985. 
 
4. The introduction of Attack 
The leadership of President Maruta 
In the spring of 1986, there was a huge controversy in Kao's board 
meeting with respect to the possibility of the success of their new product Attack 
with both the new powder processing technologies and the fermentation 
engineering technologies of their own alkaline cellulase.  There was uncertainty 
on the sales side and certainty on the cost side.  The growth rate of the 
domestic laundry detergent market was declining year after year and the market 
was considered to be rather saturated.  Kao, Lion and P&G had been 
competing with each other in such a zero-sum game, which reduced the 
profitability of all the three players.  In addition, in the 1970s, they failed to 
expand the market by concentrating detergents or adding enzymes.  Some 
people who were in charge of the marketing activities insisted that launching 
Attack was extremely risky and reckless.  On the cost side, it was evident that if 
the two major technologies were combined, the capital investment would be 
significant.  Some people in the accounting and financing department insisted 
that it would be rather unlikely for Kao to recover their investments.  These facts 
were sufficiently convincing for concluding that it was impossible to further 
stimulate the market growth and expect higher profitability.  The outcome of 
introducing Attack in the market was rather unpredictable and Murata and Inoue, 
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who were mainly responsible for the product, made unrelenting attempts to 
convince the opponents. 
The president of Kao, Yoshio Maruta, made this tough decision.  He became 
the president of Kao in 1971 and continued to hold this position for fifteen years.  
Moreover, he was the Director of Research and Development from 1976 to 1979 
and reformed the structure of research and development during this period.  He 
aimed to enable the researchers to collaborate more frequently and freely; he 
established a research laboratory for life sciences in Tochigi and several other 
laboratories.  He ensured that the laboratories were constructed in a ballroom 
style so as to not separate the researchers, and thereby permitting them to freely 
visit other research laboratories to conduct meetings.  Furthermore, if a 
researcher felt the need to collaborate with another researcher, he could assign 
the researcher to attend the meeting with him regardless of the position of the 
assigned researcher.  Maruta held an R&D meeting seven to eight times a year 
and this meeting was held in the R&D centre or other branches of the R&D 
centre.  Maruta and the other board members would attend the R&D meetings 
and other field researchers were also welcome to attend these meetings.  
Murata had given presentations in the R&D centre more often than other 
researchers because he was eager to legitimize the development of Attack.  In 
this meeting, Maruta was excited to observe the outstanding result of the 
experimentation conducted by Murata and his group of researchers and decided 
to launch Attack.  What is noteworthy here is that although Maruta was excited 
to introduce Attack into the market, their sales forecasts were rather modest.  
They predicted that Attack would substitute ten percent of their extant detergents 
in the subsequent year of its introduction, and invested approximately 3.5 billion 
yen for establishing its production system in the Kashima plant4. 
On 3 March 1987, Kao announced that they had succeeded in developing a 
distinguished laundry detergent.  In this announcement, Maruta said, 'We finally 
achieved an innovation in the field where even we had almost given up finding a 
possibility of innovations.  We are extremely excited about it.'  One month after 
that press release, Kao launched Attack only in the Metropolitan and Tokai areas.  
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A 0.75 kg box of Attack was priced at 450 yen and a 1.5 kg box was priced at 
870 yen.  Their sales projection for the first year was 20 billion yen, which 
accounted for ten percent of the entire laundry detergent market in Japan. 
 
Its commercial impact 
Despite the fact that they had launched Attack only in the Metropolitan 
and Tokai areas, its commercial impact was outstanding.  Attack recorded a 
29.7 percent monthly market share by brand in May 1987 and a 41.0 percent 
weekly market share for the week 1824 May 1987.  Consumers preferred 
Attack owing to its compact product size, which made it easy to purchase and 
transport the detergent, and the cleaning performance of the new detergent that 
was achieved by using only one-fourth of the amount of the extant detergents 
surprised them.  This time, consumers did not use extra quantities of the new 
detergent because Kao had placed a plastic measuring spoon in each package.  
Wholesalers and retailers also supported Attack because they could save on 
their transportation costs and shelf spaces owing to its compactness.  In 
particular, during this period, the number of convenience stores was increasing 
in Japan and they required compact products owing to the limitation of shop 
space.  The market demand for Attack exceeded far beyond Kao's sales 
predictions. 
By the end of June, Attack was launched throughout the country, and the sales 
plan was revised upward to 35 billion yen.  Simultaneously, Maruta made a 
top-down decision for expanding the facilities for producing Attack.  Inoue said, 
'He (Maruta) said that he had never experienced this strong demand in the 
laundry detergent market so far and that was why he made such a daring 
decision to meet it.5'  Initially, Kao used to produce concentrated detergents 
only in the Wakayama factory; however, subsequently, the company 
simultaneously established the following new facilities: the Kawasaki Plant in 
Kanagawa, Kyushu Plant in Fukuoka and Sakata Plant in Yamagata.  They 
also expanded their alkaline cellulase producing facilities since they had 
accumulated their own know-how of fermentation engineering. 
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As a result, the sales of Attack during the first year were 35 billion, which was as 
per the revised sales plan.  A director, Michinori Mochiduki, reported that 'the 
business was in the red three years ago because of the oil crisis, but now Attack 
absolutely got the business back.6'  In February 1988, Kao marketed Bio New 
Beeds as their second concentrated detergent with enzymes.  They also 
decided to invest 11 billion yen for further expanding their capabilities and set a 
sales target of 48 billion yen for 1988. 
 
Why was Lion's counterattack delayed? 
Lion's counterattack was surprisingly slow.  Although they reduced the 
price of their major brand Top in order to compete with Attack in September 
1987, they did not launch any new compatible brands like Attack in 1987.  Lion 
launched High Top on 20 April 1988, which was their first concentrated 
detergent with the enzyme, alkaline lipase that was initially delivered by a 
subsidiary of Novo, Novo Seikagaku Kogyo.  The price of a 1.5 kg package of 
High Top was 870 yen, which was exactly the same price as Attack.  In addition, 
the president of Lion, Atsushi Kobayashi, had become the division director of 
their household business on 30 March 1988.  This was mainly because as 
compared to Kao, Lion's overall corporate performance relied more heavily on 
their laundry detergent business.  
Although the laundry detergent business was much more important for Lion than 
for Kao, their counterattack occurred one year after the introduction of Attack by 
Kao.  What was even worse was that Lion's new product was not sufficiently 
strong to recover the company's market share.  Although the initial plan was to 
produce 300 thousand cases of High Top by investing 1.5 billion yen at the 
Chiba plant, they noticed that as compared to the planned ratio, they were 
required to lower the operating ratio by 2030 percent.  Owing to this, Lion was 
able to launch High Top as per schedule only in Tokyo and Osaka, and 
managed to expand its area only to Nagoya, Chugoku and Shikoku areas by 20 
May 1988.  The nationwide launch of High Top took place only by the end of 
June 1988. 
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This delay was notably extraordinary in the long history of competition between 
Kao and Lion.  Lion had originally been enthusiastic regarding and successful 
at the introduction of new products with new concepts.  Table 1 indicates the 
major brands introduced by Kao and Lion since 1960.  In a majority of the 
cases, Lion used to be the forerunner and Kao used to follow Lion's lead.  Lion 
fell behind Kao only three times including during the introduction of Attack by 
Kao; however, in the first two cases, they lagged behind Kao for approximately 
only half a year.  Kao's introduction of Attack was the only case wherein Lion's 
counterattack was delayed for an entire year.   
Why was Lion's counterattack against Kao delayed for such a long period of 
time?  This was not because Attack came as a bolt from the blue.  The prices 
of detergents were falling in the market and Lion had been investigating the 
patents that were being issued by Kao.  This information indicated that Kao had 
been working on certain innovations that would be revealed in the near future 
and that they had been working on concentrating detergents and 'discussing 
when to enter the market.7'  However, Lion delayed their counterattack.  The 
main reason for this delay was their hesitation to follow the movement of 
concentrated detergents with enzymes.  This hesitation stemmed from 1) the 
success of their prime detergent Top, 2) their evaluation of Attack and 3) their 
experience of concentrated detergents in the 1970s. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Detergents by concept (From 1960 to 1988)  
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Source: Kondo (1973) and the corporate history of Kao 
Firstly, they had succeeded in establishing a competitive position in the market 
by introducing Top in 1979 and did not want to disturb its sales and profitability 
by launching another new brand with a new concept like that of Kao's Attack.  In 
 Kao Lion Concept 
1960 
Zabu (March) New Top (March) Cleaning 
power 
1961    
1962  High Top (April)  
Less frothy 1963 New Beads (February)  
1964    
1965  Blue Dia (March)  
Colored 
powder 1966 
New Wonderful (February)  
1967  Dash (February)  
Cleaning 
power 1968 
Super Zabu (February)  
1969  Spark (February)  
 
600 Yen 
detergent 
1970 White Wonderful (October)  
1971  Blue Chaim (February) 
1972  Pinky (February) 
1973 Popins (February)  
1974    
1975 
Shin Zabu, Shin New 
Beads (July) 
Spark 25, Blue Dia 25 
(November) 
Concentrated 
detergent 
1976    
1977    
1978    
1979    
1980 
Just Funmatsu (March) Non-phosphate Top 
(October) 
 
Phosphate 
free and 
enzyme use 1981 
Non-phosphate Zabu 
Koso(August) 
 
1982    
1983    
1984    
1985    
1986    
1987 Attack(April)  Concentrated 
detergent with 
enzymes 1988 
 
High Top (April) 
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this sense, Lion was facing a dilemma at that time.  Secondly, Lion recognized 
the existence of the following issues with Attack: The cost per use of Attack was 
higher than that of Top.  For example, the 1.5 kg package of Attack was priced 
at 870 yen.  Since consumers could use this 1.5 kg pack for 60 washes, the 
cost per use was 14.5 yen.  On the other hand, in the case of Top, consumers 
could purchase the 4.1 kg package at approximately 900 yen and use it for 102 
washes, which implied that the cost per use was below nine yen.  The cost per 
use of Attack was 60 percent higher than that of Top.  The issues were with 
respect to not only the cost but also the technical aspects of Attack.  Since 
Attack contained numerous surface-active agents, its solubility was lowered 
despite the fact that Kao had incorporated solubility-enhancing agents as well.  
In addition, they believed that since the detergent powder particles in Attack 
were hygroscopic, it would tend to become a big ball in the box.  Thus, they 
believed that would be more suitable to take their time and develop a much 
better detergent even if they were going to introduce a product that would be 
compatible with Attack.  Finally, Lion failed to attract consumers by selling 
concentrating detergents in the 1970s and thought that the market demand for 
concentrated detergents was rather limited.  These evaluations and facts 
apparently convinced Lion that consumers would not benefit by using Attack and 
its commercial success would be poor.  Therefore, they delayed their 
counterattack and launched High Top in April 1988.  Indeed, looking at Attack's 
success, a managing director of Lion Kazuhiko Ohkawa said, 'we had not 
expected that Attack became that smash hit.8'  Another managing director 
Rikuo Terao also expressed the same view9. 
The delay in reacting to Kao's Attack imposed a great burden on Lion's 
competitiveness.  Graph 1 indicates that Kao's market share soared to over 40 
percent in 1987 and peaked at over 50 percent in 1989.  Although Kao and Lion 
had been close competitors for the top spot in terms of the market share before 
the introduction of Attack, Kao began establishing sustainable competitive 
advantage since 1987 and have been able to retain its position ever since. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
This paper illustrated the events of the laundry detergent market in Japan 
in the 1970s and the 1980s.  At the time, the two largest lakes in Japan were 
polluted and the laundry detergent companies were being criticized owing to the 
use of phosphate in their detergents, which was leading to the occurrence of red 
tides in these lakes.  The laundry detergent companies began reducing the use 
of phosphate in their detergents; however, this resulted in a reduction in the 
cleaning performance of their detergents as well.  The two leading companies, 
Kao and Lion, began adding enzymes in their detergents in order to recover and 
improve the cleansing function of their detergents.  The existence of 
environmental pressures was favourable at this point. 
It was not Lion but Kao that was able to accomplish an outstanding technological 
innovation.  Kao achieved a bio-technological innovation and introduced a new 
detergent called Attack, which dramatically changed their competitive structure.  
Attack was innovative because Kao developed 1) their own fermentation 
engineering technologies in order to get the alkaliphilic strain to stably produce 
alkaline cellulase, which selectively interacts with celluloses in the interfiber 
spaces within the fibers (Murata, Hoshino, Yokosuka and Suzuki 1991), and 2) 
their own powder processing technologies for concentrating detergents four 
times as compact as their extant detergents.  These technologies were 
established completely relying on the trial-and-error approach.   
Why did Kao achieve this innovation and not Lion?  From this case it becomes 
clear that external pressures alone cannot explain why this technological 
innovation occurred in Japan.  It indicates the importance of looking at 
individual firm behaviour in detail. What is interesting about Kao and Lion is that 
Kao carried out their innovative activities based on their failures in the 1970s, 
while Lion decided not to follow Kao as they misinterpreted the reasons for their 
failures resulting in the decline of their market share. Their attempt to outdo each 
other by making the different decisions through framing their experiences under 
external pressures was critical in determining innovation.  
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Another event that must be mentioned is that Kao conducted vertical integration 
by establishing their own sales function in order to reach out to their customers; 
however, Lion did not do this.  As compared to Lion, Kao succeeded in listening 
to their patrons' voices much more clearly and closely.  As mentioned earlier, 
even though Kao developed a close association with their customers, people 
who were in charge of marketing in Kao were not depending on the introduction 
of Attack.  This implies how difficult it was even for Kao to predict the 
potentiality of Attack and that it was quite unlikely for Lion to feel any possibility 
because they had many wholesale dealers between their customers and them. 
Considering the events that occurred in the Japanese laundry detergent market 
during the 1970s and the 1980s has a significantly contemporary meaning in the 
sense that determining the manner in which economic activities and 
environmental sustainability can be linked together is one of the most crucial 
topics.  In this sense, this paper will be helpful for the future research of 
new-coming countries' economic and firm activities and their sustainability. 
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